7 equality; what Perlman called the "free gift" of the suffrage antedated the emergence of capitalist economic institutions. (8) More important than the possession of this free gift, of course, was the way that it was organized. Here, too, a surprising unanimity has emerged in this literature around the argument that the ballot box was "the coffin" of class consciousness in America because of the apparent openness and equality of the political .system, the organization of politics on the basis of ethnicity, territoriality, and patronage, and the institutionalization of politics in political machines which rewarded ethnic particularism with divisible material incentives.
For example, the decline of artisanally based class consciousness is now thought to have been brought about in large part by the appearance of ethnic political machines, which, a s part of a non-ideological party system exploited locality based ethnic divisions "more than anything else" and thus produced a split between radieal politics at the work place and the politics of ethnic bargaining and accommodation in the neighborhood. The maintenance and manipulation of this split throughout the nineteenth century was one of the factors in the post Civil War disruption of what David Montgomery h a s called the "sense of moral universality among 'the producers"' that S booth where non-ideological particularism takes over and the favor, the city permit, the patronage job prevail.
In the works of the historically oriented political scientists, the political aspects of the relationship between class and politics are handled more deftly. In particular, these authors underline the challenges of party building a t both the institutional and ideological level. Bridges, for example, has emphasized both the necessity of party leaders to mobilize majorities and the need of workers to pursue political goals through the parties in her account of the way class and politics intersected in the antebellum period. Shefter has included both the decentralized nature of the American state and the relative accessibility of its local branch in his explanation of the way in which both trade unions and political machines organized working class life in the later nineteenth century. (10) In the end, however, for both it was the political machines that played the key role. For
Bridges "the institutions of machine politics coordinated a n accommodation between the working classes and their social betters." For Shefter, "at least in the major cities ... machines consolidated their position as the most important vehicle through which the working class participated in politics." (11) This interpretation now also plays an important role in considerations of the "exceptionalism" of the American state. Building on the accounts of Katznelson and Shefter, for example, Theda Skocpol has emphasized the "crucial consequences" for public policymaking of the subordination of government functions to the patronage needs of the political parties. According to Skocpol , a factor in the relatively late development of the American welfare state was the role of "patronage democracy" including the "urban political machines based on the ever-renewed streams of immigrants flowing into the American industrial working class." Because of patronage democracy, politics served primarily "symbolic-expressive and entertainment functions" and was not a matter of using parties to articulate demands for policies in the collective interest of wageearners as a class. Instead nineteenth century politics involved "getting out the vote" within "the various ethnically and religiously based local residence communities that formed the remarkably stable building blocks of grassroots support for the major party organizations." (12) Somewhat surprisingly, these understandings of the role of ethnicity, patronage, and machines are almost identical to those of the so-called "consensus" historians. For them, for example, the patronage based politics of the urban political machine were the perfect response to both the functional needs of urban society and the non ideological character of American politics.
For the generation of the fifties, political machines extended social exceptionalism into politics; for current commentators the political machines blocked the transmission of radicalism from society into politics. In both cases the conception of politics is society-centered, non-ideological, and functionalist. For reasons having to do primarily with its "middle range" theories, much of the "new" history has simply "rediscovered" the political propositions of the "old."
The Liberal Matrix for Political Analysis Most current interpretations of urban and community politics in American history have been deeply influenced by middle-range theoretical propositions from sociology and political science that emerged out of what David Ricci has called the "liberal matrix" of political analysis that was constructed in the years immediately following World War Two. To understand the contingency--and contestability--of these frameworks, it is necessary to begin with a brief look a t the intellectual history of this era and the elements of this matrix. (13) For the first three or four decades of the twentieth century a reform-oriented "progressive" social science paralleled--indeed included some of the same persons as--progressive history, As Edward Purcell has written, these political scientists and sociologists believed in the ultimately rational nature of the universe and thought that science could lead men to a full understanding of the social process and "an intelligent reordering of American institutions in a spirit of social harmony." Somewhat ironically, both their own work and the events of the nineteen thirties and forties began to undermine these views, however, a s empirical studies began to reveal "irrational" aspects of personality and behavior within the United States and the rise of fascism and the onset of war seemed to confirm these findings outside of it. By the late nineteen thirties and through the war years, both intellectuals a t large and social scientists within their disciplines turned toward a more "realistic" evaluation of both the possibilities of and need for "reform" in America. (14) In his-recenbbook The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age Richard Pells has described aspects of the process by which liberal intellectuals writing in the.nineteen fifties consolidated this new view of American politics and society. Convinced t h a t it was necessary to chasten the naivete, simplistic dualism, and rationalism of their predecessors, these intellectuals--including, of course, those like Hartz and Hofstadter, but also many others--attempted to invent a new liberalism that was based on a more realistic view of human nature in general and American society in particular, and that was, therefore, less likely to unleash the moralistic urge to fanaticism and more likely to recognize the remarkable degree' of real social and political progress . in the United States. (15) Finding less conflict and more complexity in American society these intellectuals argued that it was both the reality and the glory of American history that politics was based upon the voluntary group, rather than the card-carrying party; ad hoc, cross class, group political alliances, rather than class alliances; and the pragmatic search for specific individual or group economic gains from politics rather than the moralistic call for the reconstruction of society itself. In this new liberal view of American politics, candidates were properly "brokers," parties agencies of mediation, and the system as a whole incremental rather than totalistic; inefficient, but less likely to destroy itself in pursuit of messianic goals.
Like most of those who have written about the intellectual history of the postwar generation, Pells has abstracted these thinkers from currents in the disciplines within which many of them worked and he has ignored the theoretical contributions of enormously influential social scientists who do not fit his definition of "intellectual." Therefore, the way that the social sciences "operationalized" these ideas is not altogether clear in his account.
Fortunately, Ricci's thoughtful book, The Tragedy of Political Science provides a case study of this process in that discipline. His analysis is important because it emphasizes that the change in political science occurred not just in terms of its propositions about American politics, but also in terms of its ways of defining social "science," theory, and method. The components of what he calls the "matrix" of liberal discourse were the redefinition of politics--both a s practiced and a s analyzed--from a matter of results to a matter of "method," the redefinition of "theory" from "Grand" to "behavioral" (or "middle range"), and the refocusing of political analysis from what "should be" to what "is." (16) Like their representatives in the "intellectual" stream political scientists in the postwar period were also worried about the extravagant claims of their prewar "liberal" predecessors.
Whereas pre-war political scientists believed that men could be the best judges of their own interests and, therefore, that responsible mass democratic government was both desirable and possible, postwar scholars developed thetheory of "elitist" democracy on the basis of precisely the opposite propositions. World-wide depression, fascism, and war underlined the "truth" that men were not necessarily the best judges of their interest, that only better trained and politically disciplined elites should participate in politics, and that politics should involve narrow and nonideological conflict. At its most ideological edge, this change of view shifted the agenda of political science from from the question "how can American institutions be changed to facilitate democracy" to "how do American institutions facilitate democracy."
Among the discoveries of such analyses were those contending that every apparently nondemocratic aspect of American politics was functional for democracy. Thus, in these years, inequality, apathy, declining voter participation, and the absence of political ideology were all argued to be positive aspects of American politics: elites were more likely to support democracy, thus inequality was good; the ignorant were less likely to vote, thus declining participation was good; agreement on the "rules of the game" was less likely to produce fanaticism than argument over first political principles, thus the absence of such discussion was a plus, etc. In the writings of some political scientists, in short, everything that seemed manifestly dysfunctional to democracy to their predecessors was now determined to be "latently" functional for democracy.
The Rehabilitation of the Political Machine
The changing status of the political machine in the literature of social science was a bellweather of this broader change. From the publication of Bryce's American Commonwealth in 1888 the machine had been the scourge of American politics and the reason that municipal government was the infamous "one conspicuous failure of the United States." For Bryce--who was president of the American Political Science Association in 1908--the master conflict in urban politics was between the rich, well educated, and the good on the one side, and the corrupt and ignorant on the other. In The American Commonwealth the machine linked together the venal and the pliable. The boss "sat like a spider, hidden in the midst of his web," with the power to dispense places, reward the loyal, and punish the mutinous because he was the best among the "knot" of political operators that "pulled the wires for the whole city," and thereby riveted their "yoke" upon it. (17) This view of the political machine--which focused on its power and corruption in order to speed its removal--was characteristic of most writing on it by political scientists until its rehabilitation in E. Pendleton that tended to produce a sense of frustration and cynicism about American political institutions. (18) Viewed against the threatening rise of totalitarianism, it was the reformer, not the "politicianv--Herring minimized the use of the term "bossn--that was the problem. Reformers failed to understand the truth t h a t men were not rational, but rather passionate and greedy.
Because they were, a political "adjuster" was needed to stand for "relativity in the struggle of absolute values." Machine politicians performed the vital function of assuring continuity and cohesion in an ethnically and economically divided community both by providing services and maintaining a political moderation that avoided "the barricades of intransigence." Rather than deserving moral opprobrium, they deserved more credit.than they received. In his review of Herring's book, E. E. Schattschneider noted that "confronted with the prospect of losing our institutions, we look a t them with new eyes." The transformation of the boss from moral scourge to human relations expert was certainly symptomatic of this attitude. (19) A similar transformation was going on in sociology, where, a s Robert Friedrichs has pointed out, a pre-war reformed oriented focus on social institutions was replaced by a post-war focus on the functional necessities of the "social system." Again the changing status of the political machine reflects this transformation. For the "social engineers" of the of the early decades of the century the machine was part of a vicious circle that could be broken by an informed electorate, for their critics in the fifties, its "latent functions" were critical to the urban "system." (20) The reform view of the machine predominated when, in 1935, the distinguished sociologist F. Stuart Chapin undertook to systematize the institutional approach in sociology in his Contemporary American Institutions: A Sociological Analysis. For Chapin a sophisticated institutional approach to local government required consideration of not only the "legalistic" pattern of government reflected in law and charter, but also the pattern of the less obvious "quasilegal" world of the boss and the political party and the "extra-legal" world of patronage, bribe, and corruption. In his view, the need of political parties for funds, business for privileges, and criminals for protection led to a sinister link between these worlds. Understanding of the interlock between these institutions could lead to the breakage of this "vicious circle" by means of increased voter participation and the expansion and professionalization of public services. (21) Robert K. Merton took precisely this set of institutional linkages, but reversed their moral charge in his classic analysis of the "latent functions" of the political machine which first appeared in 1949. The successive editions of Social Theory and Social Structure (in 1949, 1957, and 1968) played an enormous role in the redefinition of the social sciences in terms both of "theory" and research agenda. Merton, as is well known, invented the term "middle-range" theory to apply to that category of theory that lay between "working hypotheses" on the one hand, and "unified systems theories" on the other--in essence the same thing as "behavioral theory" in political science. Moreover, he made major contributions to such theory, popularizing the concepts of latent functions, "reference" groups, and locals and cosmopolitans, to mention only those that were to .. . play.an important role in the reconstruction of American political history. (22) Merton offered his famous.distinction between "manifest" and "latent" functions in an attempt both to codify and exemplify functionalist thought and to extol its advantages to the other social sciences. Such a distinction, he said, clarified the analysis of seemingly irrational social patterns and directed attention to theoretically fruitful fields of inquiry. It also precluded "the substitution of naive moral judgments for sociological analysis," and in this way the distinction also tied him tightly to the overall intellectual and political mission of generation which was, a s we have seen, the replacement of "naive" reformism with "realistic" science. (23) Indeed, a s Alan Ryan has pointed out, like other members of his intellectual generation, Merton was "impressed with the unlooked for goodness of the consequences of much social life in America." According to Ryan, the only reason for using the term "latent function" was to emphasize that "the good results he is looking a t are not those which gratify the actors, but those that gratify other people." But this equation of "function" with "good consequence" had a deleterious effect on the sociology of this period, when "articles on such topics as 'Some Social
Functions of Ignorance' turn out to be articles on 'Some Unthought of Good Effects that Ignorance Produces for almost Everyone."' (24) In this spirit Merton opened his analysis of the functions of the political machine with a critique of the moralistic approaches to it of his predecessors which did not, in fact, explain its vitality so much as hope for its extinction. According to Merton, the recognition that, in spite of its apparently manifest corruption, the machine was satisfying basic latent functions was the beginning of a scientific analysis of the phenomenon. For Handlin the urban machines were the crucial link in the immigrants' political acculturation. The boss had usually arisen from among the immigrants and "remained one with them," championing the little man against the big and seeing to the ward and neighborhood issues, such a s housing, employment, etc. that affected the immigrants' day-to-day existence. For
Hofstadter, who based his account of machine politics entirely on Handlin, the easygoing and pragmatic boss understood the immigrant's desire for concrete personal gains from political participation because he worked within a political ethos which sprang from the urgent needs [of the immigrants] that so often grew out of their migration." For both historians, the focus of reformers on the alleged corruption and fiscal extravagance of the bosses was misplaced "moralism." More important was the fact that through the functions they fulfilled, the bosses placed human needs above "inherited notions and inhibitions," and in so doing, according to Handlin, they prevented socialism and radicalism from taking root among the immigrants. (27) I t was no coincidence, of course, that these bosses looked a lot like FDR. Merton himself had exemplified the way the machine "humanized and personalized" aid to the needy with a footnote referring to a story about Harry Hopkins' work under Roosevelt. Handlin argued that it was the machine that "opened to the immigrants the prospect that the state might be the means through which the beginnings of security could come," although it was not until the New Deal that immigrants were no longer "divided by the necessity of choosing between their own machines and condemnation of the machine, however, because of their concern for the machine's centralization of urban authority. Whatever its ethical faults, they argued, the machine was apparently able to overcome the decentralization of urban political authority which blocked the undertaking of public projects. For this reason, it was never to be compared to "ideal" alternatives, and, in some instances, it was preferable to any alternative likely to appear on the urban political scene. Lowi argued somewhat similarly that an "honest" machine that centralized authority for the public good might be the solution to the crisis of urban government. (29) Social Science History and The Revival of Ethnicity
For -the first generation of postwar brokers between history and the social sciences like
Handlin and Hofstadter the social sciences were a grab bag into which historians could reach for ideas without necessarily transforming the discipline itself. Although both were open to the instruction of the social sciences, they were not convinced that history should become one.
Moreover, both were more deeply involved in the reconstruction of American history along the lines of the "new" liberalism than in the reconstitution of history as a social science.
For the first generation of their more social scientific successors, however, like Lee Benson and Samuel P. Hays, the goal was to use the social sciences to transform history itself, to develop a "social scientific" history which focused on the structure of social and political behavior and avoided the focus on "episode and ideology" in the naive political narratives of their predecessors.
For the most part, these historians were oblivious to the politics of either "empirical social science" itself or the specific middle range frameworks they borrowed. Benson turned to Merton's theory of "reference groups" as a way of understanding how there could be any meaningful political conflict in an economically consensual society; Hays inserted Merton's conception of "locals and cosmopolitans" into a modernization framework a s a way of explaining the change in consciousness brought about by the modernizing thrust of American social development. However, this argument, too, was influenced to a great extent by the theoretical framework within which it was framed. Benson's turn to Merton was a turn, as others have noted, to a n essentially voluntaristic theory of action, a non-structural theory of "group" formation, and a system in which the role of power was relatively underdeveloped. Merton's theory of reference groups was based upon the theory of relative deprivation, and contended that attitudes and action were more influenced by the groups with which one identified--positively or Reflecting his interest in social history, Hays' work was more social "structural" than that of Benson. Moreover, Hays blasted the work of Hofstadter for its emphasis on the role of the "middle class" in urban reform and its reliance on the analysis of middle class "ideology" in its theory of progressivism. Structurally generated struggles for power were the centerpiece of the works of Hays and the reason for his popularity among those who attacked consensus history.
As I have written elsewhere, however, the cutting edge of Hays work was dulled by its definition of "structure" in essentially structural-functional terms. In a 1965 essay on the "social analysis" of American political history Hays called for attention to the "systematizing and organizing processes inherent in industrialism as the dynamic force in social change in modern life" and the structure of relationships--between "locals and cosmopolitans"--which those processes generated. More than just these terms were borrowed from Merton, however, so also was
Merton's explanation of the "relative proportions" of locals and cosmopolitans in different communities a s resulting from "characteristic forms of environing social structure with their distinctive functional requirements." (35) By 1974 in a n essay on the political structure of the American city this structuring process had blossomed into a "constant tension between forces making for decentralization and forces making for centralization in human relations and institutions," and a political system "shaped and reshaped" according to the "inner dynamic" of the changing economic and social order. If in
Benson politics was detached from structure, in Hays politics was overwhelmed by it; "structures"
and "processes" generated reified worldviews which took the place of conflicting political actors.
.
. . . to advance-economic interests, they argued that it was to solidify those that were "cultural." (37)
The successors to Benson and
Moreover, within this framework even apparently "economic" issues--e.g. the tariff--were viewed as really only culturally symbolic; flags, as i t were, so that voters motivated primarily by local ethnocultural issues knew for which party to vote. The reinterpretation of "economic" issues a s "cultural" was important to this framework because, as Richard The Persistence of Pluralism in the "New" Social History
The construction of a "social" analysis of politics by Benson and Hays was contemporaneously accompanied by a broader turn to social history by the so-called "new" urban historians beginning with Stephan Thernstrom. These analysts focused primarily on "societyM--actually social mobility--rather than politics, and employed the community study as both object and method. The implicit and explicit theory of these studies was pluralist; pluralism both rationalized their separation of politics and society and explained the--usually poorly examined--links between social and political mobility.
Because of its role in +.he community power debates of the nineteen sixties, pluralist theory is often thought of a s primarily a set of statements about "who governs" in contemporary America. In the work of Robert Dahl it was this, of course, but also much more. I t was a dynamic and historical theory of politics which attempted to explain the relationship between political ideology and institutions, economic development and political development, individual mobility and political consciousness, and, ultimately, "society" and the "state." The famous "Book I. From Oligarchy to Pluralism" in Dahl's Who Governs presented a sophisticated, apparently empirical, resolutely behavioral, and easily generalizable theory of the development of American local politics that was to have an enormous impact on historians. At a high level of generality, Dahl argued that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries New
Haven--and by invited extension, American communities everywhere--had been ruled by interlocked socioeconomic, political, and a t times religious elites. However the effects of largescale social changes like industrialization, immigration, and population growth were to destroy the socioeconomic basis of this elite by creating new sources of economic power, generating greater social complexity and permitting population growth. All of these changes multiplied the bases of political power and, thereby, the number of political elites. As society became a mosaic of groups, the rational approach to politics was one rooted in political conflict among self-interest groups--or their leaders--whose goals were short-term, pragmatic, negotiable, and capable of being fulfilled within the existing framework of social and political institutions of American society. Agreement on these conditions formed a consensus on the rules of the game, and competition among the many groups maintained a rough political equilibrium. (42) This socioeconomically driven shift from "cumulative" to "dispersed" inequality in American society was facilitated by the expansion of the state produced by a linkage between political integration and social mobility. In New Haven, new socioeconomic groups--especially ethnic groups--entered society a t the bottom and experienced an initial period when their "proletarian" status prevented them from engaging in political activity. However, as members of the group began to achieve lower middle class economic status and therefore had the leisure to work in politics, they began to experience political mobility as well; as more members of the group became active the public sector grew in response to their needs through a patronage-based process similar to the "latent" functions described by Merton.
This was not, however, the only similarity to Merton's analysis. Equally important was a theory of psychological mobility very similar to that espoused by Merton. For Dahl, to begin with, there was "no distinctive working class outlook that could be formed into an ideology and program different from that already expressed in middle class ideals." This was because of the social mobility process, in which "each generation of workers was enormously more prosperous than its 
Pluralist Neo-Marxists
Under the influence of the British marxist labor historians like E. P. Thompson American social historians after Thernstrom transformed the study of "mobility" into the study of "class formation," and in so doing demonstrated that the "mobility ideology" was an inadequate description of the ideology of the American working class just as the process of "mobility" in no way captured the entire experience of capitalist industrialization. (47) In effect, in response to the pluralist separation of economy and polity the historians of the working class rejoined these spheres by politicizing production, arguing effectively that the "economic" is "political" in the sense that the relations of production produce with them certain relations of domination and ideological justifications for t h a t domination. Their careful reconstructions of the patterns of work and -their detailed exegesis of a wide variety of sources for .. . understanding working class "culture," revealed the-interweaving of economics, politics, and ideology in the sphere of production. Similar attention was not, however, lavished on the workings of politics; in many of these studies, in fact, politics was a crucial but residual category explained in recognizably pluralist terms.
This pattern was set in one of the first direct responses to the work of Thernstrom, Alan These neo-marxist community studies--and others like them--ended with pluralist understanding of politics for reasons having to do both with marxian theory and their own historical practice. As, among others, Erik Wright has pointed out, the understanding of "the political" in marxian theory was not one of its most fruitful formulations. Politics entered marxist analysis primarily in two ways, in the moment a t which and process by which a class shifted from its purely economic existence "in itself' to its political existence "for itself," and in the political institution that was essential for reproducing the structure of capitalist economic relations. In crude hands the process of class formation was completely teleological, the pattern of state action, wholly instrumental, and as late a s 1977 Ralph Miliband complained about both of these problems in the Marxian theory of democratic politics. (50) This theoretical problem was compounded by both the amount and the type of attention these studies devoted to politics. Because the focus of all of them was on class formation not political formation, politics was invariably considered in a seemingly obligatory, but always brief and inadequate single chapter. Moreover, the analytical style of these chapters was remarkable different from those dealing with class. While the former were usually structural, quantitative, and detailed the "analysis" of politics resorted to the "old" political history with a vengeance: a Recognition that states are "weighty actors" with their "own" histories may in due course correct this problem. (53) This essay has tried to point out, however, that the problem is more complicated than that.
Across the social sciences the effort to use historical and institutional means to "bring the state back in" is contaminated by the conceptual residues of a particular moment in American history when the identities of and connections among social science, history, liberalism, and the state were redefined. It is said that hegemony~is accomplished when the views of one class become the "common sense" of another. Few would deny that it is just "common sense" that American urban politics involves ethnicity, patronage,. and machines.
Of course, no one would argue that'ethnicity or patronage were irrelevant to nineteenth The contribution of the neo-marxist community studies has been the reintroduction into American history of class and conflict a s social and political realities. Moreover, this works suggests that political economic issues--from the control of police to the maintenance of common lands--were of great importance. However, acceptance of a view of the state as primarily an arena of symbolism, ideological manipulation, or pure and simple "pork-barrelism" has led this literature to a sort of imperialistic economism in which the process of production has been the only or a t least the most important location for the production of political ideology. This has led these historians either to ignore or trivialize the power of political ideology to shape social and economic ideologies.
The contribution of the historically oriented political scientists like Katznelson, Shefter, and
Bridges has been a shift from the "social" to the "political" roles of machine politics; from machines as uncritical respondents to "needs" of the urban masses to political organizations with their own imperatives. The problem of this literature is the centrality and inevitably of machine politics itself; assumption that the machines are the key to American political development.
Taken together, these approaches "shrink" the state. Taking politics seriously requires its expansion; the recognition of the manifold ways in which politics helped to constitute nineteenth century American society. The legislative and judicial branches of the state and local levels of the American state were fundamentally and continuously involved in the definition and redefinition of "public" and "private" in terms of property, interests, and realms of action, and those activities were continuously salient politically.
In its everyday actions the state was continuously conferring privileges and creating--or In the course of these battles, the "agrarians" and "aristocrats," "producers" and "drones," "people*' and "monopolists" were groups whose material reality and ideological status were created in and by the state. Only by ignoring political ideology can labor historians contend that the "producer" ideology emerged a t the point of production to become the language of class in America. In fact this ideology emerged out of political combat and was appropriated by working class organizations. I t is this, origin, of course, which explains its ability simultaneously to facilitate and obstruct radical action. Moreover, it is in part for this reason that labor historians have avoided detailed comparisons of "labor" and "party" ideology: they contain many of the same ideas. (56) Against this background of contentious state action, the battle over the so-called ethnocultural issues--e.g. the enforcement of temperance, sabbatarianism, etc.--was also a battle over the extension--or retention--of state authority over society. Moreover, the political alignments on these issues were similar to those on others; Whigs and Republicans favored state action on ethnocultural issues and in other areas; Democrats opposed the former and campaigned actively for retrenchment a t both local and state levels. Ethnocultural political alignments were not necessarily, therefore, just symbolically expressive, but also linked to prior positions on economically related activities of the state.
In fact the post civil war political era a t the state and local levels opened not with ethnocultural issues but with assaults on the activities of the pre-war and wartime state in the public debt limitation campaigns conducted in state after state following the War. When the 1880 census surveyed these limitations on the state and local public sector for the first time, it found that 15 of the 38 states had added debt restriction provisions to their constitutions, while three others had authorized legislatures to do so. Twenty four of the thirty eight states had restricted the right of cities to invest in railways, twenty five barred them from investing in private corporations. All but three of the constitutional debt ceilings were adopted before 1877, indicating that they were not just responses to the "panic" of the mid-1870s, but had to do with more deep seated reactions to state economic and fiscal activities. Historians have, for the most part, ignored these movements, in spite of their rich potential for revealing the "sense" of the state in these years. (57) In addition to creating resources, of course, the state extracted them; state activity was controversial in part because it was costly. Statistics on property ownership and geographical mobility suggest that it is probable that the highly mobilized post-Civil War electorate was constituted both a s voters and as "taxpayers" especially in the urban areas, but, again, the latter identity has been almost ignored. Nationwide the level of non-farm homeownership--and thus eligibility for property taxation--was about 37 percent in 1890. Moreover, this homeownership spread remarkably deeply down the class structure, a s it was not unusual for immigrants to own homes a t a higher rate than the native born and for a s much as 40 percent of skilled workers to own homes. I t is also the case in mobility studies that those who accumulated property were those most likely to stay in one place and that homeownership was age specific--those who aged in one place were very likely to own homes. (58) Because the most important qualification for suffrage in the late nineteenth century was residence and those most likely to stay in one place were also likely to accumulate real property and thus pay property tax, it is very likely that the relationship between spreading tax liability and increasing political participation was not coincidental. For example, throughout the nineteenth century the most highly mobilized ethnic group was the Irish, who were also the ethnic group with the highest rate of homeownership in many cities. However, a s Stephan Thernstrom has pointed out, this property accumulation was achieved by means of what he calls "ruthless underconsumption," and the hold of immigrants on their property was tenuous at best. This new work suggests that groups which have been thought to be proponents of the expansion of government had more interest in stopping that expansion since the only guaranteed result of such expansion was an increased tax bill. (59) The question of resources and costs brings us back to the literature on the political machine which has been blissfully unaware of these issues. The functional model of the political machine provided a license for historically oriented social scientists to "discover" machines in city after city by ripping urban politics out of its institutional, ideological, and fiscal contexts. More recent historical and comparative work has produced abundant evidence that the all-powerful urban boss rarely, if ever, existed. In fact, urban politics was simply too contested, urban policymaking too complicated, and urban policymakers--believe it or not--too responsible to support the image of the all-powerful urban boss. There were, of course, politicians a t precinct, ward, and city levels who were called "bosses," and some of these men headed political and other organizations that could dispense "patronage" of widely varying amounts and types and could a t times "deliver" some votes. But there were remarkably few "machines" that controlled city-wide political offices for long periods of time, there is remarkably little evidence that political organizations either wanted or had the resources to meet the needs of the urban masses, and there is no evidence that the presence of "machines" fundamentally affected patterns of political mobilization. (60) All of these problems and more are revealed, for example, by reading back to back the accounts of New York City politics written by Wilentz, Bridges, Shefter and David Hammack, in which there is almost -no agreement on when the "machine" became the "machine," or exactly what difference that made. The variety in these accounts, however, testifies to the ability of these authors to discover the complexity of politics in New York city; the problem is the attempt to jam that complexity into the "machine" straight-jacket. (61) Considering the various ways that the sub-national state helped to constitute society by acting or refusing to act, the various issues around which political mobilization occurred or failed to.occur and the various ideologies that these actions generated, the most damning thing that can be said about the view of politics from ethnicity, patronage, and machines is simply that it is a n extraordinarily narrow way of viewing the relationship between state and society in America.
This narrowness is not surprising given the circumstances out of which this view emerged; its persistence is, however, given the wealth of tasks entailed in "bringing the state back in" to American history.
